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1. The General Paradigm of Late Industrialization
The character of late industrialization is different from that of
industrializations of earlier eras. Late industrialization, as the term is
used below, has a timeframe set in the twentieth century (especially after
World War II). It involves the transformation of a relatively limited
number of countries from an agrarian or raw material base to an industrial
one. The distinctiveness of late industrialization lies in its
technological behavior.
As I have argued elsewhere, industrialization in the eighteenth
century in Britain may be said to have occurred on the basis of invention,
or the search, largely through trial and error, for better products and
processes in the context of the small scale firm.1 Industrialization in
the nineteenth century in Germany and the United States may be said to have
occurred on the basis of innovation, or the mass commercialization of
invention through a process involving systematic problem solving, often in
the context of the R&D laboratory of the modern industrial enterprise.
While these two modes of industrialization differ, if only in their degree
of scientific content and firm organization, they share in common one key
characteristic: the generation of new technology. The generation of new
technology was key insofar as it colored the way in which leading firms
from the U.K., U.S., and Germany realized productivity improvements and
competed for market share. By contrast, late industrializers have
1 See Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: Late Industrialization in South
Korea, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
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generated no new technology. The mode of late industrialization has been
one of learning, or borrowing technology from more economically advanced
societies. Borrowing requires creativity, just as innovativeness or
inventiveness requires learning from others. Nevertheless, industrializing
on the basis of learning rather than inventing or innovating involves a
different form of competition, a different model of productivity
improvement, and, in general, different characteristics of firm behavior
and business-government relations from those of the past. With respect to
the labor market, the focus of this article, the labor supply of late
industrialization has tended to be "unlimited," as W. A. Lewis' classic
article (1954) implied, and the labor force has tended to be more repressed
(although hostility to organized labor is not unique to the twentieth
century).
Because industrialization through learning appears to generate a
specific set of dominant characteristics, these characteristics are common
to what is otherwise an heterogeneous group of countries. The attributes
of late industrialization appear in countries as disparate as South Korea
(the example in this article), Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, India, and
even Japan, although the Japanese experience is sui Reneris in certain
respects.2 Perhaps the most striking difference of all among latecomers is
their economic performance. All are bound by having industrialized through
learning, but their growth rates have differed sharply. Japan, South
20ne could not add the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore to this list
because they never transformed themselves from a raw material or agrarian
base.
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Korea, and Taiwan have tended to grow faster than the others for a more
sustained time period.
I have suggested elsewhere that reasons for the superior
performance of these three countries rest with differences in the way the
basic learning paradigm has operated--due to the specificities of the three
countries' history, geography, culture, etc.--and not to the operation of
freer market principles. 3 Thus, for example, governments in all late
industrializing countries have used the subsidy to get relative prices
'wrong' in order to stimulate investment. But whereas the subsidy was
typically dispensed as a giveaway in, say, Turkey and Mexico, it was
dispensed according to the principle of reciprocity in Korea and Japan, in
exchange for opaque performance standards. This lent a measure of
discipline to the whole accumulation process. As for the labor market,
although abundant labor reserves and political repression have
characterized almost all late industrializations, Korea and Japan have
distinguished themselves in two respects. First, in Korea in particular
average real wages have possibly risen faster than in any previous or
contemporary industrial revolution (with Japan a close runner-up). Second,
while wage segmentation by gender and manufacturing industry is common to
all late industrializations (and, presently, to advanced countries),
segmentation has taken an extreme form in Korea (slightly more so than in
Japan).
3The typical explanation for the success of Taiwan, South Korea, and even
Japan is that these countries conformed more to the free market model than
other late learners. For the case of Korea, see Kim and Roemer (1979).
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These labor market deviations from the late industrializing
pattern have contributed to the dynamic character of the Korean and
Japanese economies. Rapidly rising real wages from a very low wage base
have allowed firms to reap high returns while driving the more prudent
among them to invest in greater technological capability in the future. A
segmented workforce has had the virtue (whatever its vices) of providing
labor-intensive businesses with a cheap source of labor and
capital-intensive businesses with a labor aristocracy that is motivated.
It is the purpose of this article to characterize labor market behavior in
Korea, against the background of earlier and contemporary
industrializations.
While Korean industrialization is a fascinating subject unto
itself, the general interest of this article lies in the following: First,
why real wages rose in Korea amidst what appears to have been abundant
labor reserves cannot, I would suggest, be resolved single-handedly with
the economists' traditional supply and demand tools. In part, Korean wages
have risen rapidly because learning in Korea has been especially intense,
higher wages being a reward to workers to exercise their intelligence at
the workplace to facilitate technology transfer. Although labor economists
have developed the concept of "implicit contracts," that involve higher
wages in return for greater effort and "loyalty" to the firm, such a
concept is an ad hoc addition to traditional theory. It also remains to be
shown, as this paper attempts to do, precisely what the nature is of the
effort being rewarded. Second, the puzzle leads to the issue of labor
market segmentation, which may help economists think about segmentation
elsewhere. Whereas labor market imperfections are often held responsible
for the emergence of segmentation in economically advanced countries,
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segmentation arose in Korea in what by all accounts is an almost "perfect"
labor market. The reasons for the arrival of labor segmentation in Korea
tell something about the nature of the skill set of late industrialization
in general. Third, Japanese industrialization has aroused intense interest
because of the competition it poses in world markets. It is, however,
easier to understand Japanese industrialization when it is coupled with
Korean industrialization, both comprehended in the context of late
industrialization through learning.
A final caveat remains. This article is concerned with drawing
relationships over long time periods and across countries, and the attempt
to do both simultaneously makes it difficult to employ econometric methods
of analysis. While the presumed determinants of Korea's rapid wage
increases are discussed, no attempt is made to assign weights to their
respective significance. In short, this article should be regarded as an
effort in drawing parallels, with the aim of stimulating further discussion
and research.
2. Labor Supply
Countries that have industrialized since World War II, by
comparison with either England, the European emulators, or the United
States, have done so on the basis of far larger labor reserves, or what
W.A. Lewis calls an unlimited supply (1954). Greater labor reserves may be
inferred from differences in population growth rates, international
migratory flows, and obstacles to labor organization (one cannot infer
surplus labor from unemployment rates because these are unreliable).
a. Population
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According to Kuznets' estimates for countries that are currently
industrialized, the growth rate of population from the mid-1700s and
onwards was rarely more than 1.5Z (1966). One exception was the population
of the United States which grew much faster because of inward migration.
The population of Japan, on the other hand, was abundant throughout the
period of industrialization despite a very slow population growth rate.
From 1869 to 1940, the Japanese population is estimated to have grown at
only about 11 per annum, and after the war, it grew by only about 1.1Z
(Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976). By contrast, in developing regions
(excluding Latin America), the population growth rate steadily increased
from about 1.5Z in the 1940s to about 1.7Z in the 1950s. In Latin America
the average annual population growth rate was 1.9? in the 1930s, 2.3Z in
the 1940s, and 2.7Z in the 1950s (Sanches-Albornoz, 1974). In the 1960s,
population growth rates averaged 2.4? in "low income" countries, 2.5? in
"middle income" countries (which include Korea and other
late-industrializing countries), and 1.02 in industrialized ones (World
Bank, 1979). All told, the typical colonial pattern produced abundant
surplus labor. Minimal investments in health and sanitation by the
colonial authorities enabled the population to grow; minimal investments in
industry and agriculture dampened demand for labor's services; hence, the
ultimate "distortion" brought about by colonial rule.
Given Korea's high population density and inequitable income
distribution, a scarcity of labor never existed, even in the mines and
plantations of the Japanese colonialists. During the colonial period the
labor market behaved as one would expect; between 1910 and 1940, real wages
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fell (Grajdanzev, 1944).4 Further evidence of excess reserves came during
World War II when the Colonial Office drafted 2,000,000 Koreans for wage
employment in Japan's least remunerative industries (Japan had prohibited
migration before the war). Although land reform in late 19409 Korea was
labor-absorbing, by 1960 it was estimated that perhaps one-fifth of the
industrial and agricultural work force, two million people, were unemployed
(Reeve, 1963).
b. International Migration
By comparison with countries that industrialized relatively early
in world history, Japan's industrialization marked a turning point after
which countries experienced not only faster growth rates of population as
they industrialized but far fewer opportunities to send their surplus
populations abroad. Since the end of World War II, capital has become more
mobile internationally, while labor has become far less so. Fewer than
half a million Koreans emigrated permanently in the two decades following
1962, although temporary migration to the Middle East was heavy in the
1970s (S. Kim, 1982). According to Kuznets,
The significance of intercontinental, and presumably
international, migration in the growth of countries of origin
and of destination in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries lends importance to the failure of Asia, Africa, and
much of Latin America to participate--even before World War
I--and to the sharp decline in these flows after World War I
(1966: 56).
41n Taiwan, by contrast, they appear to have risen. See Ho (1984).
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The contrast between present-day migration and that of the period
from the second half of the nineteenth century to the end of World War I is
striking. An estimate of European migration during the period 1851-1920,
when the population of all of Europe was far smaller than that of the
developing world today, puts the number at more than 40 million. About
half of those who migrated did so in the last three decades of the
nineteenth century--a number equivalent to over 40Z of Europe's natural
population increase during those years (Woodruff, 1973).
c. Obstacles to Labor Organization
By comparison with countries that achieved industrial
transformation earlier in world history, countries that have industrialized
since World War II have generally tended to do so in the absence of a
coherent trade union movement or of a parliamentary labor party. The
weakness of trade union activity is partly tied to the demise of the
skilled crafts, which says something of the skill base of late
industrialization. Whereas skilled labor in earlier industrializing
countries was at the vanguard of worker protest movements and trade union
organization, a property of late industrialization is a relatively small
role for the same type of manual skilled labor in any capacity--be it labor
leader or scarce resource. Discussion here is restricted to the first,
that of labor organizer.
In early industrializing countries, the extreme difficulties of
effective general unionization--due to rapidly rising population, great
labor mobility, very low real incomes, sharp economic fluctuations, and a
hostile law--were chipped away by the class of skilled workers.
In England, "Effective trade societies were first confined to the skilled
handicraft workers--the "aristocracy of labour." (Mathias, 1969: 364).
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In Germany, "... former artisan resentment contributed to the foundation of
a labour movement, particularly of the Lassallian sort (Kemp, 1985: 105).
In the United States, "...Gompers and his associates.. .argued that unions
had to "perfect" their organization and establish themselves on a
"permanent" basis by providing their members with unemployment benefits,
burial insurance, sick pay, and strike benefits. ...This mode of
organization was far easier to establish with unions that represented
skilled rather than unskilled workers (Shefter, 1986: 259-60).
The part played by the artisan in late industrialization has
depended on the country. In Japan, the role of artisans resembled more
that of early industrializers than that of late ones (Sumiya, 1974). In
India, industries that could use modern technology did so by way of import
substitution, not the destruction of artisanal production, which expired
long before the arrival of factory production in the face of coercion and
competitive imports from more advanced countries. In Korea, an artisanal
tradition was weak, and whatever traditional skills that developed which
weren't beaten down--furniture manufacturing, tailoring, and tanning, for
example--began to be undertaken in the "informal" sector. While the
informal sector is estimated to have accounted for as much as one-half to
two-thirds the size of nonagricultural employment in the late 1970s (Bai,
1982; Lindauer, 1984), no material for labor leadership emerged from it.
3. The Rate of Pay
Despite repression, unlimited labor supply, the absence of
international migration, and a weak grouping of skilled workers, real wage
rates in Korea soared, whereas they rose only desultorily in other
late-industrializing countries. Table 1 compares real wages in Korea,
Table 1
Real Nonagricultural Wage Increases,
Korea. Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and India, 1970-1984
Koreaa Brazilb
100
102
104
119
130
131
154
187
219
238
227
225
241
261
276
100
110
114
119
119
127
129
134
142
134
130
118
115
97
84
Argentina
100
105
99
107
126
124
80
76
77
87
100
91
79
97
112
Mexico Turkey Indiac
100
103
104
104
107
114
123
125
122
121
116
119
117
86
83
100
100
99
98
96
116
122
146
147
155
124
130
129
130
111
100
100
106
97
110
120
116
124
130
Taiwan
100
107
98
110
126
138
151
163
166
171
180
188
191
Note: Base - 100. Deflated by consumer price index.
aReal earnings manufacturing sector.
bAverage wages for skilled workers in construction. Data are from the
Central Bank.
cRupees per hour for industrial workers.
Source: As cited in Amsden (forthcoming).
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
- 10 -
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, India, and Taiwan during the period
1970-1984. The 1970s were a period of rising real wages in all these
countries, but in Korea they rose spectacularly. The index of real wages
in Korea increased from a base of 100 in 1970 to 238 in 1979.5
Korea's wage behavior appears to be unrivaled in earlier
industrial revolutions, although Japan's is almost as impressive.
In the case of England, Lindert and Williamson (1983) use new
data and new methods of data manipulation to show that in the 70-year
period spanning 1781-1851, their "best guess" of the increase in the real
full-time earnings of all British workers was 155Z, 99Z in the case of
blue-collar workers. In their most pessimistic scenario, the gains were
100? and 62?, respectively. However rosy Lindert's and Williamson's "best
guess" estimate, it pales by comparison with Korea's. While it took
English workers 70 years to raise their real earnings by roughly 150?,
Korean manufacturing workers achieved a comparable gain in about 20 years
(from 1955 to 1976). In just one decade, 1969-79, real wages in Korea rose
by more than 250? (Lindauer, 1984, provides data on Korean wages).
The long-run trend in real earnings of workers in the United
States, England, and the European emulators is estimated by E.H.P. Brown
(1968). The most authoritative source for comparative purposes, Brown's
data are for the period 1860-1913 for five countries: France, Germany,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Among the five
5 Industrialization, of course, began before 1970 in all these countries,
but one also notices faster wage increases in Korea than in India, Brazil,
or Taiwan during the earlier period. Taking 100 as the base in 1957 (1959
in Taiwan), the wage index in 1969 reached 77 in Brazil, 123 in India, and
156 in Korea (Amsden, forthcoming).
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countries, real average wages (expressed in composite units of consumables)
grew fastest in the United States. Taking, therefore, the United States
index at its trough and peak--approximately 45 in 1865, just after the
Civil War, and about 130 in 1913, just before World War I--real wages
increased in the United States by 2.9 in roughly 50 years. In Korea,
however, real wages increased even faster, from trough to peak by 4.3 in
roughly half as much time, 25 years (Lindauer, 1984).
Japan's best wage data are divided into two subperiods, 1900-1935
and 1950-1968, and refer to production workers in manufacturing
establishments of 30 or more production workers (Minami, 1973). Ignoring
gender differences, real wages for all production workers rose from about
120 Yen in 1900 to about 430 Yen in 1935, or by a multiple of 3.6 in 35
years. After World War II, they rose even faster, following labor unrest
in 1947-49 and the onset of the prosperous postwar international division
of labor. Real wages rose by a factor of 2.7 in 18 years, from
approximately 400 Yen in 1950 to about 1200 Yen in 1968. Again, however,
real wages in Korea rose even faster--by a scalar of 4.3 between 1955 to
1980 and by one of 3.6 between 1966 and 1980 (Lindauer, 1984). Wage rates
in Korea, moreover, are understated in comparison with those of Japan.
Whereas Korean data are restricted to firms with over 10 workers, Japanese
data are restricted to firms with over 30. Yet smaller firms in Japan are
believed to have begun paying lower wages than larger firms after the 1920s
(Minami, 1973: 172-73).
4. The Reasons Behind Rising Real Wages
Indirect labor, which includes managers, engineers, and
technicians, is supposedly the scarcest type of labor in backward
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countries. Thus, one would expect late industrializers to experience
abundance and scarcity of direct and indirect labor respectively, the wages
of the latter pulling up the overall average. The pattern of wage increase
in Korea, however, flies in the face of expectation. As Table 2 indicates,
in four subperiods from 1965 to 1984, the rate of wage increase was higher
for production workers than it was for professional, technical, or
managerial employees, notwithstanding excess supply, supposedly most
characteristic of the direct labor market.
In the late 1970s, Korea allegedly reached a "turning point"
(Bai, 1982), its supply of surplus labor vanishing, with the outflow of
workers--mainly to the Middle East--amounting to as much as 27Z of the male
manufacturing work force (MOL, Various years). Table 2 confirms that wages
increased in the late 1970s especially fast. Nevertheless, such scarcity
proved short-lived with the collapse of the Middle Eastern construction
market and a slowdown in Korea's growth rate. Thus, in the 20 years
spanning 1965 to 1984, a tight labor market was the exception to the rule,
yet real wages rose persistently.
The Demand Side
If Korea experienced faster real wage increases than did other
late-industrializing countries, this is partly because its GNP grew faster.
A rapid rate of capital accumulation provided the basis for rapid wage
increases. S.W. Nam (1980) estimates an equation to explain the rate of
change of nominal manufacturing wages in Korea during the period 1966-1977.
He includes variables to represent the demand for labor (the rate of GNP
over the previous year), the supply of labor (the lagged change in
manufacturing employment), and inflation (the lagged change in prices).
Table 2
Changes in Wage Rates Between Production and
Professional, Technical, and Managerial Workers
Production
Workers
Professional, Technical,
and Managerial Workers
12.8 6.6
6.17.1
16.8 15.3
5.3 2.5
Source: 1965-1979, Bai (1982); 1980-84, MOL.
Iear
1965-70
1971-74
1975-79
1980-84
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The strongest explanatory variable is the demand for labor, or the previous
year's change in GNP.
The period in question, 1966-77, was the Golden Age of Korea's
industrial expansion. Output, exports, and productivity were all growing
very rapidly. Not surprisingly, wages also rose. Even if the government
did not intervene directly in wage determination, employers were under
strong pressure from the government to share their gains with labor. The
rate of real wage increase also tended to stay below the rate of labor
productivity growth (except in 1976-79 and 1982) (MOL, various years). The
wage strategy of big business amounted to gainsharing.
Nevertheless, ambiguity surrounds the determination of the impact
of fast growth on real wage increases.6 In Brazil, for example, it seems
that the impact is weak. The average annual growth rate of the Brazilian
economy during the period 1950-75 was as much as 6.7Z. Yet while real
wages increased for the majority of the period, they did so very slowly
(Amsden, forthcoming).
The Supply Side
In order to arrive at an explanation for why real wages have
risen more rapidly in Korea than in other late-industrializing countries,
the following areas are explored: the low base from which wages in Korea
have risen; the structure of Korean agriculture--a consequence of land
6Nam's equation fails to explain why wages rose, notwithstanding the
inclusion of a variable intended to measure labor supply. According to
Nam, "the fit of the wage equation to the data is not excellent," although
a similar model provides better correlation with the inclusion of a dummy
variable for the period 1970-77 (1980: 79). Norton and Rhee (1980)
estimate a wage equation with a dummy variable, GNP, and a price deflator
(but no supply effect) and get an R2 of 0.88.
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reform in the late 1940s; the unrivaled length of the work week; and market
segmentation--by gender, firm size, and industry. The factors operative in
Korea which help one to understand its rapid wage increases, moreover, also
tend to have been operative in Japan during its period of rapid wage gains.
The factors operating in both countries also go well beyond any simple
"cultural" explanation.
a. Korea's Low Wage Base
Korea's wages grew fast but they started from an exceptionally
low base. In a symposium in the mid-1960s on wage trends in developing
countries, it was asked why the Far East had experienced no structural
inflation similar to Latin America's. Three answers were forthcoming, all
of which hinted at the extreme poverty characteristic of Far Eastern
economies at the time.
First "the backwardness of these countries--even by the standards
of developing regions--means that the industrial labor force tends to be
unorganized and in no position to force wage rises when the cost of living
increases..." (Smith, 1967: 27). Second, because of the small size of the
industrial sector, industrial expansion does not place excessive demands on
agricultural output. Third, the marginal product of labor in agriculture
tends to be low because of high population density, so rural-urban
migration does not reduce agricultural output. Inhabitants per square
kilometer in 1960 were 109 in South Central Asia, 86 in Europe, 71 in East
Asia, 48 in Southeast Asia, 14 in Southwest Asia, 11 in Central and South
America, 10 in the Soviet Union, 9 in North America, and 8 in Africa
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(Smith, 1967: 27).7 Thus, from a low wage base in Korea, it was easier
for employers to remain internationally competitive and yet raise wages, if
only to improve the physical stamina and psychic motivation of their
workers.
b. Land Reform and Small-Scale Agriculture
Rapid increases in productivity in Korean agriculture acted to
drive up wages in modern industry. The "implicit wage" of male workers in
agriculture exceeded the average wage in manufacturing until the late 1960s
(Ban et al., 1982). According to Bai's estimates (1982), the male wage
rate in agriculture exceeded that in modern industry until at least the
mid-1970s.
Korean agriculture employed few proletarians (hence, the
"implicitness" of the agricultural wage rate). Instead, the agrarian
reform of the late 1940s invested land in the tiller, so a tenure system of
small-scale, family farms evolved, which required few hired hands except at
harvest. Given sharp increases in agricultural productivity as a conse-
quence of government support, rural-urban migration and downward pressure
on manufacturing wages can be assumed to have been less massive than it
would otherwise have been. The labor retentiveness of Korean agriculture
by comparison with less egalitarian land tenure systems is suggested by
7One might add that neither of two tendencies operating towards a high wage
level in Africa and Latin America operated in the Far East. In Africa, the
relatively high pay scales of European civil servants in the British and
French colonial services were adopted by locals during the period after
independence. In labor-scarce Latin America, early European settlers
earned European pay scales. By contrast, Korea experienced almost no inward
migration from advanced countries, and the pay scales of Japanese colonial
administrators may have become only a dim memory after the war and chaos
that terminated Japanese rule.
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international comparisons of the share of agricultural employment in total
employment. Despite the limited availability of arable land, Korean
agriculture's share of the labor force in 1980 was as high as 34?, compared
with, say, 30? in land-rich Brazil. The Korean share was even higher than
that in Taiwan, although both countries had experienced land reforms (World
Bank, 1982). Consequently, both a lower-than-otherwise flow of rural-urban
migrants and a higher-than-otherwise rural household income buttressed
manufacturing wage rates.
c. Women Workers
Nonetheless, one can still say that Korea has industrialized (and
continues to do so) with unlimited labor reserves. To the question of how
agriculture may preserve a society of family farms yet provide industry
with enough labor to keep wages at a socioeconomic subsistence level, W.A.
Lewis provided this answer:
There are the wives and daughters of the household....
The transfer of women's work from the household to commercial
employment is one of the most notable features of economic
development (1954: 404).
Not only has Korea set world records with its growth rate in
wages, it has also outcompeted other countries in its discrimination
against women workers, although in some years (1984, for example), this
dubious distinction fell to Japan. In 1980 the male-female wage gap was
greater in Korea than in any other country for which data are available
(ILO, 1981).
Almost 60? of the male-female wage gap in Korea has been
attributed to differences in human capital between the sexes. It is
estimated that 27.6Z of the gap is due to differences in education and
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31.82 to differences in experience (traditionally, women have been forced
to leave paid employment when they marry). Thus, ".. .part of the wage
differential between the sexes in South Korea seems to be rooted in 'before
labor market discrimination' in addition to...'labor market discrimina-
tion,'... but both are closely interrelated" (Lee, 1983: 67). There are
virtually no women in managerial or even entrepreneurial positions in the
primary manufacturing sector (Grootaert, 1986).
The human capital explanation for the gender wage gap would lead
one to expect discrimination to recede as women invested in more education
and acquired more experience. Yet such is not the case:
During the past few decades, gender inequality in educational
opportunities at all levels of schooling has.. .continuously
decreased.... The participation in the labor force of those with
secondary and tertiary education increased at a much faster rate for
women than for men with [a] decreasing proportion of primary school
graduates... .Moreover, the proportion of women in [the] 25-29 age
group, who have the burden of childbearing and childrearing, has
increased, which suggests improved women's labor-force
attachment... .In contrast, the male-female earnings gap remains large,
without reduction (Y.H. Kim, 1970: 4).
d. The Lenath of the Workweek
In the length of its workweek, Korea has set still another world
record. Even allowing for rapid increases in demand, Korea's workweek
length exceeds expectation and has underwritten large increases in wage
rates. For all persons employed in manufacturing in 1984, 73Z of men and
621 of women worked at least 54 hours per week (Grootaert, 1986). By
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contrast, in other countries the average for persons employed in
manufacturing was much lower (ILO, various years).
The length of Korea's workweek can be understood historically.
The Japanese colonial factory system was harsh, and Korean workers grew
accustomed to a workweek similar to what then prevailed in Japan and, say,
Germany at the turn of the century. According to one contemporary account,
The men in large-scale enterprises in 1939 [in Korea]
worked on an average of 10 hours a day, and women and children
10 hours and 15 minutes, and 10 hours and 20 minutes,
respectively... .With respect to holidays, the usual
arrangement is two rest-days a month, though in 1931, an
investigation of enterprises with 10 workers and more revealed
that 35? of these enterprises had no rest-days whatsoever
(Grajdanzev, 1944: 184).
What is extraordinary about Korea is that long workhours have
continued to persist well after the Second World War. This may be
understood in terms of both the weakness of organized labor to shorten
hours for a given wage rate and labor's willingness to take advantage of
rapid industrial expansion through higher wages for endless toil.
e. Segmentation
Upward pressure on wage rates came especially from large-scale
firms in basic industry. Table 3 shows the origins of Korea's segmented
labor market. The rate of wage increase during the labor-abundant period
1965 to 1971 varied according to industry, ranging from a low of 175Z in
rubber products to a high of 415? in petroleum and coal products. The
upshot was a large dispersion in manufacturing wages.
Table 3
Percent of Wage Increases
in Selected Sectors of Hanufacturinga
(1965-1971)
Increase of
Sector 1971 Over 1965
Food 3361
Textile 227
Wood and Cork 222
Paper 288
Leather 215
Rubber 175
Chemicals 354
Petroleum & Coal Products 415
Basic Metals 222
Metal Products 296
Machinery 208
Electric Machinery 363
Transportation Equipment 313
Average 269
aCalculated from figures published in Sanop Saingsan Yunbo ("Annual
Report on Current Industrial Production Survey") (Seoul: Economic
Planning Board, 1972), pp. 68-81.
Source: Ewing, 1973.
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Yet another world record that Korea holds is the degree of wage
dispersion in the manufacturing sector. In both 1973 and 1982 the standard
deviation of wages (in logs) was greater in Korea than in 13 other
countries examined, Japan taking second place (Krueger and Summers, 1986).
Nor has such manufacturing wage dispersion become more compressed in Korea
over time (Richardson and Kim, 1986). The capital-intensive industries
have continued to pay more than textiles, wood, and miscellaneous
manufacturing. Wage dispersion also varies across firm size, especially
when one disaggregates by gender.
The dispersion in interindustry wages is largely accounted for by
blue-collar workers. According to Lee, "The interindustry differentials
among white-collar workers are lower than among blue-collar with only a few
exceptions" (1983: 172). In part, blue-collar workers earn different wage
rates in different industries because they have different marginal
products, those in the capital-intensive industries probably being higher.
However, it is unclear why capital-intensive firms pay a wage rate equal to
their workers' marginal product rather than paying the all-manufacturing
average.
Wage dispersion by industry and by firm size is present in most
countries that are now industrialized or that are in the process of
becoming so. In the former, segmentation arose in response to a complex of
factors, including trade union pressures (See Osterman (1984) for
references). In Korea, however, one cannot attribute much of the
interindustry blue-collar wage differential to worker militance. The
interindustry wage structure in Korea assumed its present form during a
wave of repression, during which only remote threats of collective action
were evident. Labor leaders and dissidents had been severely persecuted
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during and after the Korean War in the 1950s, and in the early 1960s the
entire labor movement felt the heavy hand of the military government (labor
affairs were the jurisdiction of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency).
In fact, the threat of collective action was greatest among those who
remain the lowest, not highest, paid workers. The "factory girls" in
textiles and apparel tend to be the best organized, most militant workers.
5. The Skills of the New Labor Aristocracy of Late Industrialization
To understand the rise of segmented labor markets in a late-
industrializing country like Korea, one must understand the labor policies
of the modern industrial enterprise--in Korea's case, the diversified
business group. The reason that the diversified business groups may have
paid their blue-collar workers above the all-manufacturing average was that
the skills of such workers were in scarce supply because they tended to be
firm-specific. In the case of male workers, one year of 'inside'
experience (with the same employer) tended to raise wages on average by
about 10?, whereas one year of "outside' experience (with a different
employer) raised them on average by only about 3.8Z (Lee, 1983). The
interesting question then becomes what firm-specific "skills' were being
rewarded.
One must start by understanding differentiation among firms.
Experience in textiles dated back to the Japanese colonial period, so
expansions and modernizations in the 1950s exposed textiles entrepreneurs
to few problems. By contrast, even the huge, fixed-capital investments in
the continuous-process industries that relied initially on turnkey
technology transfers--cement, fertilizers, oil refining, and steel--created
problems for managers, of trying to bring under control a process that the
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foreign experts themselves understood only imperfectly. Neophytes that
they were, Korean managers could never hope to manage in a tight,
"Taylorist," top-down fashion, at least not initially, because no one at
the top knew enough about the process to do so. Under these conditions, it
was imperative to rely upon motivated workers, even if they possessed
little more than formal schooling, to exercise the most fundamental skill
of all--intelligence. In all of the new capital-intensive
industries--continuous process and, a fortiori, fabrication-assembly
operations and job shops of jumbo proportions-- production workers were
motivated with relatively high wage rates, first to get the product out the
door, and later, to improve quality. In short, they were motivated to
adopt a reasonably scientific approach to problem solving in a milieu whose
technology was tacit, implicit, and not yet procedurized.
For the purpose of gaining an appreciation of the skills of the
new labor aristocracy, which were being rewarded with high wage increases
during late industrialization, one may examine the personnel policies of
one of Korea's premier producers, the state-owned Pohang Iron and Steel
Company (POSCO).
a. The Personnel Policies of the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO)
POSCO maintains a three-tier wage structure. Managers are the
highest paid and then comes a sub-class of blue-collar workers.
Blue-collar workers in POSCO are divided into two categories: "regular"
and 'contracted out." In 1984 contracted-out workers numbered 8,700, or
24? out of a total work force of 25,700. Contracted-out workers are
confined to menial tasks such as relining, cleaning, packing, preparing
ingot molds, scarfing, and treating slabs. POSCO is estimated to save
about 15Z in wages by contracting this work rather than delegating it to
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regular employees (PaineWebber, 1985). Regular employees are well-paid by
Korean standards--about twice the manufacturing average, depending on the
annual bonus--although POSCO claims that it never faced a labor shortage.
Thus, the internal wage structure of production workers at POSCO
reflects the external one at the national level. Production workers are
divided into high-paid and low-paid categories that are analogous to those
of the permanent and transitory employees in Japan.
In exchange for relatively high pay and the job security that
comes with employment in a company that is expanding rapidly, POSCO expects
attentiveness from its workers throughout their long hours on the job. A
century ago, steel-making required strenuous physical effort on the part of
production workers, as well as proficiency in the art of steel-making on
the part of master steel-makers (earlier, iron-puddling would have been
considered a skilled craft). The category of master steel-maker or "saint
technician" still survives in POSCO, but largely as a vestige of the past.
After a decade of operation, only one master technician and five submasters
exist. Instead, steel- or iron-making for production workers involves
process monitoring and control, as well as auxiliary operations such as
overhead crane driving, etc. POSCO has 450 job categories, and the largest
number of workers can be found at data-collection stations positioned at
well-defined, set points in the process. Workers check sensors for
temperatures in different process zones, note the chemical composition of
gases, and register flow rates. For this, however, they must have a fairly
good understanding of the physical and chemical reactions involved in iron-
and steel-making--in order to ensure high quality--since steel production
is not all in closed-loop control, and the acceptable limits of materials
change.
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To increase productivity, POSCO provides its workers with
extensive training. In a single year, 1984, 9,924 workers out of 23,700
received training in one form or another (Amsden, forthcoming). Of
interest even beyond the quantity of training though is the curriculum.
The aim is to instill in all workers a general knowledge of POSCO's
operations and operating principles (25 percent of total training). Only
to a lesser extent is training oriented toward building in-depth,
specialized skills. Emphasis is placed on quality control (17 percent of
total), foreign languages (6 percent), as well as training abroad (10
percent).
A normal workweek at POSCO consists of 56 hours (8x7): 45
regular hours, and 11 overtime hours for which no premium is paid. Every
worker is entitled to only one day of leave per month, plus one day for
each year with the company. In 1977 labor turnover at POSCO was 4.4Z,
below the national average--of approximately 5.1Z--in manufacturing. In
1984 labor turnover had fallen to only 1.2Z, well below the national
average of approximately 5.4Z (MOL, 1985). Absenteeism in POSCO is not a
problem. In 1984 absenteeism was only 0.07Z of labor days. Low
absenteeism and turnover are believed to be essential for high
productivity. Although the overwhelming majority of POSCO's 23,700 workers
cannot be described as possessing highly developed craft skills,
steel-making remains something of an art and learning its technology makes
in-house experience invaluable.
POSCO operates with the motto, "Resources are limited, but human
creativity is unlimited.' Limited resources, or scarcity, therefore, does
appear to have influenced POSCO's wage policy by driving it to pay higher
than average in order to attract the "best" workers. "Best" should be
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understood in a general sense, however, rather than with reference to
specific skills.
6. Conclusion
One may conclude by suggesting that if wages have risen at all in
most late industrializing countries, then they have done so in response to
the exigencies of learning. Employers have had to pay a workforce enough
to induce it to exercise its intelligence, rather than any scarce specific
manual skills, in order to import foreign technology effectively. That
wages have risen especially rapidly in Korea, despite *unlimited" labor and
political and trade union repression, may be attributed to particularly
intense learning and special institutions, both of which also existed in
Japan and help to explain its rapid rise in wages during learning-intensive
growth.
Korea's special institutions gave rise to a very low wage level
even by backward country standards, allowing wages to rise rapidly without
impinging on competitiveness; a productive small-scale agriculture, which
exerted upward pressure on urban wages; extraordinarily long hours of work,
that compensated for higher annual labor costs; and extreme segmentation of
the labor market by gender and manufacturing branch, sustaining
simultaneously the competitiveness of labor- and capital-intensive
industries. .
That learning was especially intense in Korea (and Japan) arose
from two sources. First, Korea relied less than almost any other late
industrializing country on direct foreign investment as a source of
technology transfer (Amsden, forthcoming). It behooved Korean-owned firms,
therefore, to learn in order to survive. Second, industrialization in
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Korea was more of a spurt than in, say, India, Brazil, or Turkey, whose big
businesses have a longer history than Korea's. In Korea, it was necessary
not only to accumulate experience rapidly, but also to create organizations
out of thin air; and this required buying commitment on the part of both
managers and labor.
It is noteworthy, however, that "implicit contracts" of higher
wages in return for greater effort and "loyalty" notwithstanding, Korea's
labor aristocracy and disadvantaged workers both engaged in massive strike
activity in 1987. The persistence of a low level of wages, and political
and trade union repression, offset twenty years of higher wage increases as
motivating factors, suggesting that de Tocqueville's question of whether
good times or bad times stimulate social protest remains complex.
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